Financial Regulation Reform and Too Big to Fail by McDonnell, Brett
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
Financial Regulation Reform and Too Big to Fail 
Brett McDonnell 
University of Minnesota Law School, bhm@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brett McDonnell, Financial Regulation Reform and Too Big to Fail, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 113 (2012), 
available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/115. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
FINANCIAL REGULATION REFORM
AND TOO BIG TO FAIL
BRETT H. MCDONNELLt
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the leading critique of the Dodd-Frank Act from the left is that it
does too little to address the problem of too big to fail ("TBTF") financial
institutions.' This critique is not unique to the left-many on the right
2
make similar arguments. The critique of TBTF institutions has two main
components, which I shall call the economic argument and the political
argument. The economic argument focuses on a major moral hazard
problem. TBTF institutions know they are likely to be bailed out if they
near failure because the consequences of their failure to the financial
system are dire.3 Knowing this, they take on too much risk, increasing the
chances of financial crisis.4 The political argument focuses on the political
clout of TBTF institutions.5 Their size and centrality to the financial
tProfessor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank participants at
American University Washington College of Law's symposium on Law, Finance and
Legitimacy After Financial Reform, especially panel commentators Jose Gabilondo,
Lisa Fairfax, and Peter Conti-Brown, for helpful comments.
1 See generally SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010) and JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
(2010) for two of the leading, and best, instances of the sort of critique I have in mind.
These are not actually critiques of Dodd-Frank, since they were published before the
Act passed. However, the Act clearly falls well short of the actions that both books
advocate, and the authors have subsequently made predictable criticisms of the Act,
although they are not completely critical. See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-
Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89
OR. L. REV. 951 (2011), for a discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act's limited effectiveness
in solving the TBTF problem and in ending taxpayer bailouts.
2 See generally RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: How HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010) (discussing the causes of the economic
meltdown and the continuing flaws in the current economic system); GARY H. STERN &
RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004) (warning
that not enough has been done to reduce problems of the TBTF problem).
3 Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 954.
4 See generally STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2 at 2.
5 See infra Part III.
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system gives them immense lobbying power in Washington, both in
Congress and among regulatory agencies. The revolving door places many
industry insiders at the heart of agency decision-making. The political
argument maintains that this revolving door goes a long way towards
explaining the excessive deregulation which set the stage for the financial
crisis.
There are important truths in both the economic and the political
arguments against TBTF institutions. However, there are also important
limits to the truth of both arguments. I believe the limits are more central
than the truths, and that if anything, Dodd-Frank has gone too far in
focusing on TBTF institutions. Part II explores the truths and limits of the
economic argument, while Part III does the same for the political argument.
Part IV lays out a map for my own preferred approach to the TBTF
problem. In the short run, we need relatively modest but firm regulation.
Dodd-Frank looks pretty good in many ways, but still needs some
important fixes. The longer run is more daunting: we need to find ways to
develop alternative financial and other institutions that are smaller and
more focused on community and other stakeholder interests.
II. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT
The economic argument contains an important truth that almost all
analysts have recognized in the wake of the financial crisis. The existence
of TBTF financial firms creates a severe moral hazard problem.6 TBTF
firms (many rightly point out that it may be more accurate to speak of firms
that are too inter-connected to fail),7 are tied to many other firms in many
other financial markets. If they fail, they put stress on many of those firms
and markets. 8 Particularly if such a failure occurs at a time when market
participants are already nervous about financial troubles, the failure of one
TBTF firm may set off a chain reaction that leads to widespread collapse of
many financial firms and markets.
The realistic prospect of such a chain reaction collapse creates the moral
6 Viral V. Acharya et al., Prologue: A Bird's-Eye View, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 1, 9-10 (2011); RAJAN,
supra note 2, at 18, 131; NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A
CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 68-72 (2010); see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra
note 1, at 166-74 (discussing the restructuring efforts made for economic recovery); see
also STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 118 (stating that through explicit or implicit
governmental guarantees, banks do not bear the risks they take). See generally STERN
& FELDMAN, supra note 2 (arguing that many of the problems inherent in TBTF firms
that caused the financial collapse still exist).
7 Acharya et al., supra note 6, at 2-6; ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 6, at 200.
8 Acharya et al., supra note 6, at 2-5.
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hazard problem. History 9 and political common sense strongly suggest that
the government and central bank will not stand back and face the threat of
such a collapse. Rather, they will step in and rescue the TBTF firm. But,
those running such a firm know this. It gives them incentive to take on too
much risk.10 If that risk pays off, they are sitting pretty. If it doesn't, then
taxpayers will bail them out." Moreover, TBTF firms will face a lower
cost of raising capital, 2 as investors also anticipate a bailout if things go
wrong. Thus, more resources flow to TBTF firms which are taking on high
risk, which will tend to drive the financial system towards the very crises
which regulators hope to avert. Clearly the experience of the many bailouts
in the latest crisis should make persons in the financial markets anticipate
bailouts the next time around.
This economic critique comes from all sides of the political spectrum.
Economists of all stripes can easily spot the moral hazard threat.' 3 And for
politicians of the left and right, TBTF institutions make tempting targets-
on the left, because bailouts help rich financiers while doing nothing
(directly) for common folk, and on the right because they represent Big
Government distorting private markets. So politicians from Al Franken1
4
to Michele Bachmann,"' just to focus on my own state, can gleefully take
aim at the bailouts.
But those on the left and right tend to disagree on how to solve the moral
hazard problem. Many on the left would like to cap the size, and maybe
also the complexity, of financial institutions, so that companies are not
allowed to become too big (or too inter-connected) in the first place. 16
9 E.g. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005); CARMEN M. REINHART &
KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY
(2009).
'0 STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 2.
" See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 118.
12 See Brett H. McDonnell, Don't Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During
and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at
9) (on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1753760 (discussing the
under-pricing of risk with a government bailout, like with Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac).
'3 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing the origins and effects of
moral hazard).
"4 Al Franken, To Be Blunt!, C-SPAN 2 (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://videocafe.crooksandliars.com/taxonomy/term/298 1,3312.
'" Catalina Camia, GOP Moves to Repeal IRS, Wall Street Rules, USA TODAY ON
POLITICS (last updated Jan. 6, 2011, 2:10 PM),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/20 11/01/gop-moves-to-
repeal-irs-bank-bailouts-/1.
16 JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 1, at 208-13; RoUBfNI & MIHM, supra note 6, at
226-30; STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 164-68.
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Analysts on the right tend to be skeptical of that degree of regulation. They
believe it is likely either to have unintended consequences or to be evaded
(or both). 17 Instead, they either call for lighter regulation that limits the
risk TBTF institutions can take on,' 8 or else call for limits on the ability of
the government to intervene in failing companies. Those on the left think
that lighter regulation (such as Dodd-Frank) is unlikely to solve the
problem and they are skeptical that we can credibly commit to limit
intervention in a crisis.' 9
But there are reasons to doubt the strong emphasis of many on TBTF as
the main cause of the crisis. For one thing, it is not clear that large and
complex financial institutions are, on balance a bad thing. 0 Size and
diversity of institutions can arguably increase stability. Larger, more
diverse financial institutions may be better able to weather economic
storms. 2 1 That indeed would seem to be one of the lessons of the Great
Depression, where the banking system was highly decentralized and quite
unstable.22 The more concentrated Canadian system weathered the recent
storm better. 23
Furthermore, other problems besides TBTF may have played at least as
great a role in the financial crisis. In my opinion, 24 the true core lesson
from our latest crisis should not be the problem of TBTF institutions, but
rather the problem of the shadow banking world, where unregulated
institutions and markets are economically very similar to banks, and
similarly subject to contagious panics, but they are not regulated like
banks.2 5 Panics can occur in these markets as many mid to small sized
institutions following similar strategies face similar stresses. Key examples
during the latest crisis included the panics in the money market fund and
17 RAJAN, supra note 2, at 171-72.
18 Id. at 168-69, 171-76.
19 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 1, at 208-13.2 0 Id. at 211; RAJAN, supra note 2, at 172.
21 See, e.g., RAJAN, supra note 2, at 172 ("[l]arger banks may be better at diversifying
and attracting managerial talent (including risk managers).").
22 See Elizabeth Dunne Schmitt, Professor, Oswego State Univ. of N.Y., Lecture
Notes on Chapter 13: Financial Industry Structure, (2003),
http://www.oswego.edu/-edunne/340ch 13.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
23 Tony Porter, Canadian Banks in the Financial and Economic Crisis, (Sept. 01,
2011, 11:35 p.m.), available at http://www.nsi-
ins.ca/english/pdf/Canadian%20Banks%20(tony/o2Oporter).pdf.
24 See McDonnell, supra note 12, at 8.25 Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Oncu, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo)
Market, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 319, 319 (2011); ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL.,
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING (2010).
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commercial paper markets.2 6 And the Great Depression remains the leading
example of panics caused by a series of failures in relatively small, lightly
regulated financial institutions.27 We have now regulated institutions we
label "banks," but not many similar ones. These shadow banks need
greater regulation to reduce the chances of future panics.
Moreover, there are many causes of financial firms taking on too much
risk and leverage beyond the moral hazard problem on which the economic
argument focuses. These include corporate governance failures (including
compensation schemes that encourage too much risk-taking), herd
behavior, and a tendency towards over-optimism caused by short memories
after economies recover from a crisis. 28 Human beings seem quite able to
convince themselves that this time things will be different, and that they do
not need to protect themselves against the chance of a financial crisis.29
Other problems revealed by the crisis include various incentive failures
within the mortgage-backed securitization chain3 ° and governmental
policies that encouraged a housing bubble as a way of avoiding coming to
grips with the pain of economic stagnation for the middle class.
31
In its focus on new regulations for TBTF institutions, Dodd-Frank does
too little to regulate smaller shadow banking institutions. The two most
crucial sections of the Act are its first two titles. 32 Title I extends capital
requirements and other regulatory controls to systemically significant
financial companies.33  Such extended regulation is needed for shadow
banking generally, but Title I's language would seem to include only TBTF
institutions.34 Title II creates a new resolution authority, whereby the
FDIC can quickly dispose of systemically significant non-banks that are
21 See Acharya et al., supra note 6, at 25-27; GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE
INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, 106-07 (2010).
27 See Schmitt supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28 See McDonnell, supra note 12, at 9-10 nn. 24-34 and accompanying text.
29 See REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note 9, at 208-13.
30 McDonnell, supra note 12, at 8-9. See also GORTON, supra note 26, at 39-41, 138-
41 for a discussion on problems with mortgage-backed securitization chains.
31 See RAJAN, supra note 2, at 85 (stating that the government and Federal Reserve
encouraged the housing bubble "[i]n an attempt to induce recalcitrant firms into
creating jobs.").
32 See McDonnell, supra note 12, at 3 8-42.
33 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5323
(Supp. IV 2011).
34 Id. I have suggested that creative interpretation might extend this language.
McDonnell, supra note 12, at n. 183. However, initial rulemaking does not suggest
regulators are inclined to such creativity. E.g., Financial Stability Oversight Council,
Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,555 (proposed Jan. 26, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 1310).
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financially troubled and pose a threat to the financial system. 35 If well-
used, this authority can help stop contagious panics while still punishing
the main decisionmakers in a way that reduces the moral hazard problem.
The resolution authority created by Title II is thus an important mechanism
for reducing the TBTF economic problem. But, it could also have provided
a tool for dealing with panics in smaller shadow banking institutions.
36However, here again the language appears limited to TBTF companies.
Indeed, Dodd-Frank may channel more resources into smaller
unregulated shadow banks as investors find ways to avoid the new
regulations by moving money to more lightly-regulated entities.37 Because
it buys into the economic argument against TBTF, Dodd-Frank may
actually increase the risk of future crises, precisely because it focuses
mainly on a few large institutions that on their own create large systemic
risk.
More likely than not, though, TBTF institutions do on the whole pose a
greater risk than others in the shadow banking world. Thus, tougher
regulations for TBTF institutions, as contemplated in Dodd-Frank, do make
sense. However, the ambiguity as to this point, combined with the
difficulty of drafting blanket prohibitions that would not be evadable,
suggests something short of the complete assault on the existence of TBTF
institutions that some suggest. Rather, we should have stricter regulations,
and/or possibly a tax for TBTF firms, whose level depends on the degree of
risk posed, while extending some regulations to a broader class of
companies. Part IV will consider this idea further, and assess how well
Dodd-Frank fits it.
I1. THE POLITICAL ARGUMENT
Like the economic argument, the political argument against TBTF firms
expresses some important truths. Large institutions with big pots of cash
have some real advantages in political organization. A few large
companies can more easily overcome free rider problems than many
smaller companies. 38 Large TBTF banks and their executives have much
prestige. That prestige can cause politicians and regulators to look to hire
them as regulators--consider the flow of Goldman Sachs officers into high
levels of government. 39 The prestige and high compensation of jobs at the
" 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394.
36 12 U.S.C. § 5383.
37 McDonnell, supra note 12, at 49; ROUBiNI & MIHM, supra note 6, at 212-13.
38 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (17th prtg. 1998).
39 Most obviously including Treasury Secretaries under both Presidents Clinton
(Robert Rubin), Robert E. Rubin - About, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
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large banks also work in the reverse direction, luring regulators into private
employment. Prospects of such employment may influence their actions as
regulators. Agency problems may also allow the managers of large
companies to use resources to their own advantage, including in lobbying
for legal rules. Note, though, that this last argument suggests that some
rules achieved through lobbying by TBTF executives may not be in the
best interests of the firms themselves.
The political argument is interrelated with the economic argument; they
support each other. On the one hand, capture of the political process by
TBTF institutions makes bailouts more likely, worsening the moral hazard
of the economic argument. On the other hand and more subtly, the
economic argument points to an inherent power for TBTF institutions.
Should they collapse, they threaten genuine calamity for the economy as a
whole. That gives them the power to go to politicians asking for help, with
the real threat that if they do not get it, the economy could tumble down
with them. Indeed, I believe this, more than any sort of corruption or
influence peddling, explains most of the bailouts of 2007-08.
The political argument has been around for a long time. American
distrust of large financial institutions goes back at least to Andrew
Jackson's battle with the Bank of the United States. 40  The argument
resonates on both the political left and right. On the left it fits well with
concerns about the entrenched power of a wealthy elite.4' On the right, it
fits well with standard public choice stories of capture by concentrated
economic interests. The financial industry has many companies with a
strong interest in weakening financial regulation, whereas the general
public which could be protected by such regulation has no persons or
organizations which individually stand to gain a lot from such regulation.
42
Advocates of the political argument can point to many possible examples
of industry capture, both during the long boom leading up to the crisis and
during and after the crisis. Industry pressure led to extensive financial
deregulation, including removal of limits on interest rates, barriers to entry,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/rerubin.aspx (last visited Oct. 22,
2011), and Bush (Hank Paulson), Henry M. Paulson, Jr. - About, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/hmpaulson.aspx (last visited Oct. 22,
2011), as well as a U.S. Senator and New Jersey Governor (Jon Corzine), Jon




40 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 1, at 18-22.
41 Id. at 18-22; STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 291.
42 OLSON, supra note 38; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3,11-12 (1971).
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limits on new financial products, and the end of the Glass-Steagall Act.43
During and after the crisis, opposition to new regulation was strong,
limiting what was included in Dodd-Frank. 44 Now that Dodd-Frank has
passed, industry lobbyists are working hard, and in many cases effectively,
to de-fang the new rules that regulators must promulgate.45
But, it is far from clear that the political successes of the financial world
are due to the size and influence of a few big banks. Smaller financial
institutions have some political advantages of their own. They are more
widely distributed around the country,4 6 and hence may be able to
effectively lobby in more congressional districts. They are also seen as
more politically legitimate-taking money from Goldman Sachs is quite
attractive for politicians in ordinary times, but can become an
embarrassment when times get tight. At many periods in U.S. history, big
banks have had quite a toxic political reputation--consider the Second
Bank of the United States.47 Small local banks, in contrast, have generally
had real clout in both state capitals and D.C. The populism of Andrew
Jackson is admittedly distant in the past, but even today we see real echoes
of it in the reaction to the recent bailouts. Tea partiers and progressive
activists share a deep antipathy to the bailouts, an antipathy which was
widely expressed across the political spectrum. Of course, that didn't stop
the bailouts from happening.48
Two of the strongest proponents of the political argument against TBTF
institutions, Simon Johnson and James Kwak, illustrate the past power of
many smaller companies in a telling quote concerning the savings and loan
debacle of the 1980s:
But at the time, the S & Ls-not the Wall Street investment banks-and
their lobbying organization, the United States League of Savings
43 See JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 1, at 64-87.
44 Just three Republican Senators voted in favor of the Act. Brady Dennis, Congress
Passes Financial Reform Bill, WASH. POST, (Jul. 16, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071500464.html?sid=ST2010071504699.
Only three Republicans voted for the Act in the House of Representatives. David
Dayen, Dodd-Frank Passes House, FDL NEWS DESK (Jun. 30, 2010, 4:02 PM),
http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/30/dodd-frank-passes-house/.
45 See e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dodd-Frank @1: Volcker Wrap-Up, THE
CONGLOMERATE (July 22, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/dodd-
frank-l-volcker-wrap-up.html; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't 'Screw Joe the Plummer':
The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform (September 16, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1925431.
46 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 1, at 66-67.
47 JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 1, at 18-22, 33.
48 That they did happen, of course, in part, reflects the political power of TBTF firms,
but I also suspect it reflects the reality recognized in the economic argument: not doing
the bailouts would have led to disaster.
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Institutions, were a powerful political force with influence on both sides of
the political aisle. Although individually small, they had a favorable public
image (in a country that professes to live by small-town values), they were
located in virtually every congressional district, and they benefited from the
disproportionate representation of rural states in the Senate.49
It is not clear which set of effects is stronger, and thus it is not clear
whether the financial industries really have more clout when they are more
or less concentrated. For many areas of financial regulation, it may well
not matter very much. For most regulation, the interests of large and small
financial firms may be more or less the same, and it is often (though not
always) the case that there will be little opposition to the financial industry
position because those on the other side (generally consumers) are a very
large, ill-organized group where each person has relatively weak interests.
Standard public choice arguments suggest likely industry capture of
regulation in such circumstances. Where opposition is weak, either the
more or less concentrated version of the financial industry will be able to
organize well enough to be able to impose its will.5 °
Brute political capture is not the only, and quite possibly not the most
important, variant of the political argument against TBTF institutions. A
deeper problem may be intellectual or cultural capture. A varied set of
economic, political, intellectual, and cultural forces have come together to
create a general mindset that private market actors are good and dynamic
while regulation is generally bad and stultifying. 51 Here too, though, it is
not clear that the issue is TBTF institutions specifically as opposed to
private market financial actors generally. Note too that while many left and
right commentators may agree on the standard political capture argument,
they diverge on the cultural capture argument-what leftists see as
illegitimate and misguided cultural capture, conservatives will instead see
as sensible intellectual advances. This again points to differing solutions to
the political argument, similar to the differing solutions we saw to the
economic argument. 52 Strong leftists want to eliminate TBTF institutions
in order to eliminate their political influence, while conservatives want to
heavily limit the ability of governments to act in order to limit the ability of
TBTF institutions to influence governments.
49 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 1, at 66-67.
50 OLSON, supra note 38; Stigler, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51 See e.g. James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
(Daniel Carpenter, Steven Croley & David Moss eds., forthcoming 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
52 See supra text accompanying notes 16-20; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note
1, at 208-13; RAJAN, supra note 2, at 168-69, 171-76; ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 6,
at 226-30; and STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 164-68.
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There is also another and deeper problem with the leftist call for
regulation as a response to the political argument against TBTF
institutions: it rarely offers a plausible political story for how such
regulation is supposed to happen. After all, if the political argument is true,
we can expect fierce opposition to strong regulation of TBTF institutions.
Who will provide the political will to overcome that opposition? Anyone
who wants to be more than an ineffectual Cassandra should ponder whether
they have any sort of answer to that question. There is a certain naive
moralism to much writing and speaking on the need for reining in TBTF
institutions, as if speaking out with the right degree of self-righteous
indignation should be enough to get politicians and regulators to see the
light and fall in line.
53
It is true that during the height of a crisis, financial regulation may
become a salient issue, and a populist attack on TBTF institutions may be
popular. Fear of retribution at the polls may actually prod politicians to
listen to the eloquent jeremiads of TBTF critics at such moments. But that
populist moment passes quickly, and the TBTF institutions should be able
to weather the storm by lobbying for vague legislation which appears to
address the problem, but which can be weakened to nothing in the quiet
after the storm has passed.54 Progressive opponents of TBTF institutions
must identify counter-forces which are informed and patient enough to win
a long war. They must be able to pass meaningful legislation during or
soon after a crisis, and then translate that legislation into meaningful
regulation as the economy recovers and starts to grow again, and popular
attention turns elsewhere. To date, progressives do not seem to have found
a winning answer within the contemporary political and regulatory
system. 55
53 E.g., JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 1, at 208-13; Paul Krugman, The CONSCIENCE
OF A LIBERAL http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 1.
14 Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 663, 673-75 (2004); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING
POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER
SEPARATE POWERS 7-9 (1999).
55 A partial answer is the rulemaking bureaucracy. If it can be motivated to pursue
rules that give real teeth to legislation, then it can extend the principles established
during a brief populist reform period. But the bureaucracy itself is subject to industry
capture. One can try to find ways to prod the bureaucracy to resist capture, and to
continue to explore systemic problems within the financial system. Indeed, Dodd-
Frank continues a number of mechanisms which may do just that. In another paper
with Dan Schwarcz, I explore those mechanisms. See generally Brett McDonnell &
Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (2011). See infra
note 56.
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IV. RESPONDING TO TBTF
I argue for a different sort of response from the left56 to the TBTF
problem, rather than simply forbidding financial institutions above a certain
size, as some recommend. My response has two main prongs:
implementing modestly stricter regulation of TBTF institutions in the short
run, and developing alternative financial, economic, and political
institutions in the long run.
A. Modestly Stricter Regulation of TBTF Institutions Should Be
Implemented
The first prong is modest but firm regulation. Regulation should cover
all shadow banking institutions, but larger, potentially TBTF institutions
should face stricter rules. All shadow banking institutions need to be
covered because, as we have seen, even smaller companies can collectively
cause big trouble.58 We should not prohibit overly large financial
companies altogether both because of the possible advantages of bigger,
more diversified companies, and also because such rules are an invitation
to evasion. But stricter rules are appropriate for such companies, and they
will help reduce the moral hazard problem by forcing TBTF institutions to
take on less risk. Dodd-Frank already gets part of this right-TBTF
institutions will face stricter rules, although much still depends upon
implementing regulations.5 9  Prudential standards and disclosure
requirements for nonbank financial companies may get stricter as
companies get larger, more complex, or riskier. 60 Bank holding companies
that "pose a grave threat to the financial stability of the United States" may
be restricted in their ability to acquire companies or offer financial
products. 6' Financial companies may not merge if the resulting entity
56 But I hope to appeal to some on the right as well. Hardcore libertarians would
prefer less regulation combined with stronger commitments to keep the State from
intervening in financial markets. I have argued against this elsewhere; laissez faire
ignores the real threat to economic stability that comes from leveraged financial
institutions, and there appears no good, credible way to commit to keep the government
out of financial markets. See McDonnell, supra note 12. Moderate libertarians and
conservatives should find much to like in Dodd-Frank. See id. The emphasis in my
long-term strategy on market and social institutions outside of the State should also
have some appeal for libertarians and conservatives.
57 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note
1, at 208-13; RounmNi & MIHM, supra note 6, at 226-30; and STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at
164-68.
18 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
59 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325,
5331, 1852 (Supp. IV 2011).
61 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325(a), 5365(a).
61 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a).
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would have liabilities exceeding ten percent of the aggregate liabilities of
all financial companies.62 Insured depository institutions may be prevented
from inter-state merger if the resulting entity would control more than ten
percent of the total amount of deposits for such institutions. 3 The Act also
requires large, risky institutions to create "living wills" that will direct how
to unwind them in the event of failure.64
The new resolution authority of Dodd-Frank 65 should also help address
the TBTF problem. In the last crisis, regulators confronted with sick but
not yet bankrupt companies faced a hard choice. They wanted to stop
failures that could prevent a run, but the managers of those companies
would naturally fight any interventions that punished them, even though
they were often responsible for the mess. Regulators had no stick other
than to let the firms fall into bankruptcy, and everyone knows they didn't
want that, ruining the credibility of that threat. With the new authority,
regulators can step in to a firm that is systemically risky and take it over,
throwing out the bums who got the firm into trouble if that is the right thing
to do. Throwing the bums out is not only satisfying, it helps reduce the
moral hazard problem-if the bums know they may well get thrown out,
they have good incentive to avoid risks that may get their company into the
resolution process. Title II directs the FDIC to punish the officers,
shareholders, and perhaps secured creditors of firms resolved under the
new authority. 66 The Act specifies that creditors and shareholders will bear
the losses of the company.6 7 Management responsible for its condition will
not be retained. 68 The Act provides for possible actions for damages,
restitution, and recoupment of compensation against those responsible for
the losses. 69  The treatment of secured creditors is a more difficult
question-if they stand to lose a "haircut" when a company fails, they are
more likely to act as important monitors, but they are also more likely to
start a run. The Act punts on this point, mandating a study on secured
creditor haircuts.
70
The main gap in Dodd-Frank is that it does not attend to smaller shadow
62 12 U.S.C. § 1852(b).
63 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 623(a), 124 Stat. 1634 (2010).
64 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d).
65 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394.
66 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384, 5386.
67 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384(a)(1), 5386(2).68 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384(a)(2), 5386(4)-(5).
69 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a)(3).
70 12 U.S.C. 5394.
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banking institutions. 71  Banks of course have faced a strict regulatory
regime since the New Deal. Dodd-Frank's Title I extends similar
regulation to non-bank financial institutions which pose a systemic risk to
the economy. Title II extends resolution authority based on the old
authority of the FDIC over banks to such risky non-bank institutions. But,
the language in Title I and Title II seems to only contemplate too big (or
too interdependent) firms, not smaller companies within the shadow
72banking world. Yet, as I argue in part II, the mistakes and failure of
many smaller firms following similar strategies within a market may be just
as big a danger as the failure of a TBTF firm. Dodd-Frank does not seem
to recognize that-mesmerized, it would seem, by the TBTF analysis of the
crisis. Indeed, as it stands, Dodd-Frank could actually make matters worse
by pushing more money into the unregulated smaller shadow banks. Basic
safety and soundness regulation and resolution authority need to be
extended more broadly, even though the smaller firms should be less
strictly regulated than the TBTF firms.73
There are, though, some ideas for addressing TBTF firms, short of
abolishing them, which are worth considering and not included in Dodd-
Frank. The Act does not adopt the interesting and potentially valuable idea
of taxing financial institutions for the degree of systemic risk to which they
are exposing the economy. A well-priced tax would force firms to
internalize that risk.74 The question, of course, is can and would regulators
set the tax at a plausible estimate of the level of risk a firm is creating.
Regulators already face a variant of this problem in measuring the riskiness
of bank assets in setting capital requirements.75 They have not been
spectacularly successful in solving that problem so far. The tax idea is
definitely worth exploring, but even without it, differential levels of capital
requirements and leverage limits based on riskiness would accomplish
much the same purpose. Dodd-Frank seems to require this, but we shall
see how good a job the regulators do. The obstacles are both political
(TBTF institutions will fight stricter requirements, of course) and economic
or conceptual (measuring the riskiness of a financial firm is truly hard).76
71 See supra notes 32-3 7 and accompanying text.
72 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323, 5383.
73 See generally McDonnell, supra note 12 where I discuss this problem more.
74 Viral V. Acharya et al., Taxing Systemic Risk, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 121, 125 (2011).
" Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127
(2009); Peter Miu, et al., Can Basel III Work? Examining the New Capital Stability
Rules by the Basel Committee: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Capital Buffers
(Feb. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1556446.
76 See Measuring and Managing the Value of Financial Institutions: Integrating
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Another idea is trying to make clear that only certain critical parts of
TBTF companies will be bailed out. The UK is considering structural
separation within TBTF institutions, so that certain risky activities are
conducted by a legally separate entity, and only that part of the company
not engaged in those activities would be saved during a crisis.
77
So Dodd-Frank is missing some worthwhile elements, but does have
many good parts, and it basically addresses the TBTF moral hazard
problem pretty well. But that will do little good if later on, as memories of
the crisis fade, the industry succeeds in having the laws subverted by weak
78
rules or non-enforcement. As noted above, we, as a society, would like to
design the regulatory process to help make financial regulation less pro-
cyclical and less prone to complete industry capture. Most of the time,
when the economy is not in crisis, ordinary people pay little attention to
financial regulation and the only parties who do pay attention, namely
those within the financial industry, have undue influence in rule setting and
enforcement. The public only pays attention when a crisis hits, and that is
when it becomes more possible to pass strong regulation. However, given
the relative ignorance and short attention span of the public, the resulting
legislation is likely to be either pro-consumer on the surface but vague so
that later, when things have quieted down, regulators can pass pro-industry
rules,79 or else the laws passed in a crisis may have real bite but be crude
and often counter-productive, reflecting the ignorance and haste of
legislators and the public.
80
What we would like to have happen is for the legislature to pass pro-
consumer but relatively vague laws which regulators can flesh out later, but
then have the regulators really give some teeth to the rules. Better still, we
would like to prod the regulators in good times to be monitoring, and
responding to, emerging financial risks. To achieve that, society tries to
insulate agencies from too much influence by the political process (where
industry capture is a danger), and to provide systematic ways in which
consumer interests and independent voices can be heard within the
External and Internal Valuations, WHARTON FINANCIAL RISK ROUNDTABLE 2003
(May 2003), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/0503mow.pdf. Indeed, it may be that
the problem with regulation is conceptually inevitable. If regulators attempt to
base capital requirements in part on the riskiness of a company's assets, they are
likely to underestimate the riskiness of some assets, and the uniformity created by
regulations will push all regulated companies to over-invest in those assets,
increasing their risk. See also Philip Z. Maymin & Zakhar G. Maymin, Any
Regulation of Risk Increases Risk (Sept. 7, 2011), (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 1587043.
" Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1050-5 1.
78 See supra notes 53-554 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 543 and accompanying text.
80 See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REv. 77, 78, 81-83 (2003).
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rulemaking process. Notice-and-comment rulemaking, conflict of interest
rules, independent agencies, consumer representatives, and Inspectors
General are some of the longstanding mechanisms we use to help out.
Dodd-Frank contains a variety of new mechanisms which try to prod
regulators to consider consumer interests and explore emerging financial
risks even during good times.81 Some examples include:
* Numerous studies and reports to Congress, which at least force
agencies to consider the relevant issues;
8 2
* A new Office of Financial Research;
8 3
* The new Financial Stability Oversight Council, which will bring
together the leading financial regulators and force them to
periodically at least discuss potential emerging risks to the
financial system;
84
• The new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; 85
* A new Investor Advisory Committee8 6 and Office of the
Investor Advocate within the SEC; 87 and
• A suggestion program for SEC employees.88
These are just some of the highlights; there are a variety of other
experiments within the Act.89 I hope that individually and collectively all
this will do some good at resisting industry pressure, including pressure
from TBTF institutions.
B. Alternative Financial, Economic, and Political Institutions Need to be
Developed
But shoring up the regulatory bureaucracy is not enough, not by a long
shot. As long as the basic political balance of forces remains as lopsided as
it is now, that balance will ultimately be reflected in the rules no matter
81 See McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 1670-76 where Dan Schwarcz and I
explore some of these mechanisms at more length.
82 See Broc Romanek, What the Dodd-Frank Act Means for Regulators? 243
Rulemakings and 67 Studies, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL.NET, (July 13, 2010, 7:38
AM), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2010/07/see-page-344-hooray-
kirkland.html.
83 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§
5341-5346 (Supp. IV 2011).
84 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5322.85 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 1 11-
203, §§ 1001-1100H, 124 Stat. 1955-2113 (2010) (partially codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.).
81 15 U.S.C. § 78pp.
87 Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 915, 124 Stat. 1830.
88 15 U.S.C. § 78d-4.
89 McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 1670-76.
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how well we design our rulemaking institutions. Ultimately, we need to
change the underlying balance of power, and that requires recruiting or
creating economic and political institutions outside of the government
which can counter the political power of TBTF financial institutions.
Where can one find or create such institutions? The second prong in
responding to the TBTF problem is a longer term strategy, focused on
developing alternative financial institutions that are smaller and more
focused on community interests. Progressives for decades have focused
too much on regulation and too little on building alternative institutions.
Yet ultimately the political clout of TBTF financial institutions can only be
countered by alternative institutions with power of their own.
This second prong focuses mainly on the political problem that TBTF
institutions pose. However, it also helps address the economic moral
hazard problem. The sorts of financial institutions this prong suggests
creating are likely to be not too large, and hence less subject to the TBTF
moral hazard. Moreover, insofar as they behave and invest rather
differently than other kinds of financial institutions, they will create a more
diversified financial industry. That should help reduce the spread of
contagious panics, and reduce the amount of mimicry that occurs-such
mimicry can lead to all companies taking on similar risks, creating
problems when that strategy goes bad for everyone.
Traditionally, the main source of power that countervailed the interest of
big businesses was unions. 9°  These do still matter somewhat as
demonstrated by the battle in Wisconsin over the attempts of Governor
Scott Walker to neuter public employee unions. 91 But American unions
have declined precipitously in unionization rates and political power, and
any hopes for a significant revival appear dim.92 Many factors feed this
trend. In part it is a self-reinforcing loop-the political decline of unions
allows employers to shape labor laws and enforcement so that they can
90 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER, 144-146 (1952).
91 See Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Big Budget Cuts Add up to Rage in
Wisconsin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/us/12wisconsin.html? -ri; A. G. Sulzberger,
Union Bill is Law, but Debate is Far From Over, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2011, at A14,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/us/12wisconsin.html?_r--1, and
Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Angry Demonstrations in Wisconsin as Cuts
Loom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/us/17wisconsin.html to witness the battle in
Wisconsin over the attempts of Governor Scott Walker to neuter public employee
unions.
92 Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 429 (2011).
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more easily fight unionization, which reinforces the decline of unions. 93 In
part it reflects a change in the nature of employment from manufacturing to
service industries which are harder to organize. 94 In part it reflects a
change in business organization and labor markets, as workers stay at jobs
for shorter and shorter periods. 95  The trend of union decline is
longstanding and extreme enough, and the variety of causes is large and
deep enough, that it seems implausible to look to unions as a source for
much stronger future resistance to TBTF institutions.
A very different existing source for potential support for rules containing
TBTF companies is current medium size and community banks. These
have an obvious interest in curbing both large TBTF banks and in imposing
regulations on a variety of institutions in the shadow banking world. They
also have a lot of political legitimacy, and they are spread widely
throughout the country. 96 They have much influence over many regional
Federal Reserve banks. Thus, they are a rather potent political force whose
interests in many ways align with an agenda of limiting the power and
scope of TBTF institutions. Progressives looking for as strong a regulatory
response as possible in implementing Dodd-Frank may indeed want to
explore such an alliance on a variety of measures. However, small town
bankers typically have a cultural outlook that may not make them
supporters of strengthened regulation, even regulation that applies to
competitors. And many of Dodd-Frank's regulations do apply to all banks,
including community banks-they do not like that, unsurprisingly.
97
Progressives thus need to consider helping to create new institutions that
can support their preferred rules in the long run. These institutions need to
be more attentive to the needs of consumers, employees, and communities
than the institutions which currently dominate financial markets. After all,
if public choice problems imply that those groups are unlikely to organize
93 John Logan, The Union Avoidance Industry in the United States, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS.
REL. 651, 651 (2006); McDonnell, supra note 92.
94 Robert Rowthorn & Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization-Its Causes and
Implications, INT'L MONETARY FUND, ECON. ISSUES 10, at 1 (1997).
95 See DANIEL H. PINK, FREE AGENT NATION: How AMERICA'S NEW INDEPENDENT
WORKERS ARE TRANSFORMING THE WAY WE LIVE 47-54 (2001) (discussing the factors
involved in the evolution of workers becoming free agents).
96 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 1, at 66-67; see supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
97 See, e.g., Robert M. Vinton, The Dodd-Frank Act: Impact on Community Banks,
FAIRFIELD AND WOODS (Sept. 2, 2011),
http://www.fwlaw.com/Dodd Frank Act Impact On CommunityBanks.pdf
(emphasizing a variety of ways in which the Act increases regulation for all banks). See
also Community Banks Continue to Criticize Dodd-Frank, SHESHUNOFF A.S. PRATT(July 29, 2011, 8:16 AM), http://www.sheshunoff.com/news/26/Community-Baiiks-
Continue-to-Criticize-Dodd%252dFrank.html for community bank criticism of the Act.
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over financial regulation on their own, so that financial companies will
dominate the regulatory process, it will help greatly if those financial
companies themselves are internally responsive to a broader set of social
needs.98 Also, as noted above, diversity among financial institutions may
reduce the risk of failure spreading among companies that have all taken on
similar strategies and risks. Past institutional innovations, such as credit
unions,99 mutual insurance companies,'00  community development
banks,101 and the Caja Laboral Popular bank at the center of the Mondragon
group of cooperatives in Spain,' °2 suggest the kind of direction one could
look. Indeed, some of these past innovations are part of the answer for the
future as well. Updated versions more in tune with the realities of the
modem economy and markets may be needed. Updates are needed because
some of these older institutions have taken a beating recently. Many
mutual insurance companies have demutualized.' °3 The most famous U.S.
community development bank, ShoreBank in Chicago, closed in 2010.104
The most famous international community bank, Grameen in Bangladesh,
has faced strong political controversy amid a variety of scandals. 10 5 Those
interested in creating or expanding alternative financial institutions more in
tune with social interests will need to study these past problems as well as
successes.
In addition to financial institutions, one could also look to innovations in
business forms as another way to increase support for strong regulations,
and also to lead to companies and markets which undertake less risky
financial practices on their own and feature more diversity in investment
98 McDonnell, supra note 92.
99 J. CARROLL MOODY & GILBERT C. FITE, THE CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT: ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT 1850-1980 (2d ed. 1984).100 HAROLD W. WALTERS, A CENTURY OF COMMITMENT: A HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES (1994).
1o1 CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, DEP'T OF TREASURY, CDFI CERTIFICATION
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2008) available at
http://www.cdfifund.gov/docs/certification/cdfi/CDFIcertificationFAQs.pdf.
102 WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON: THE
GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (1988).
103 See Glenn S. Daily, Reorganization Status of Mutual Life Insurance Companies,
GLENNDAILY.COM (July 11, 2007), http://www.glenndaily.com/mhctable.htm
(providing examples of mutual insurance companies that have demutualized).
104 Failed Bank Information: Information for ShoreBank, Chicago, IL, FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/shorebank.html (last updated June 15,
2011).
105 Allison Dower, Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank Scandal, PENN STATE
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strategies. Again there are older forms such as cooperatives 0 6 and
nonprofits 107 as well as newer models of social business enterprises 108 that
could prove promising. New institutions in the financial markets and real
economy companies should complement each other both politically and
economically. Non-traditional companies should find it easier to get
financing from non-traditional financial companies that share similar
values and business models.' 0 9
V. CONCLUSION
So, have I set forth a framework that is likely to lead to a solution to the
economic and political problems of TBTF financial institutions? Not
really, alas. The Dodd-Frank Act does present a potentially useful
framework. However, that framework has some gaps-most notably, the
lack of a tax on systemically risky companies. "0 Worse, industry pressure
to weaken rules and enforcement as memories of the crisis fade is already
strong and appears likely to undermine most attempts to impose notably
stronger rules on TBTF institutions or to punish them when they get in
trouble. I like the various attempts in Dodd-Frank to push regulators in the
right direction,"' and hope they will do some good, but fear that the
pressures for complacency and capture are just too strong-the regulatory
design experiments may help withstand that pressure to a limited extent,
but probably only a quite limited extent.
The call for new economic institutions to provide countervailing
economic and political power is at best a very long-term project. It would
take quite some time to build an ecosystem of such institutions to the point
where they have political power anywhere close to that of today's big
banks. There are all sorts of obstacles, economic and political, to ever
succeeding in building up such new institutions. The status quo has many
ways of reproducing itself.
Perhaps serious change will be possible only with a crisis more severe
than the recent one. That seems right at least for large-scale political
106 GREGORY K. Dow, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2003).
107 Peter F. Drucker, What Business Can Learn from Nonprofits, HARV. Bus.
REV. 88-93 (July-Aug. 1989).
108 Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporation? Evaluating Another Hybrid Model
for Social Enterprises, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Linda 0. Smiddy,
Symposium, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in Social
Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3 (2010).
109 See Brett McDonnell, Labor-Managed Firms and Banks (1995) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author).
110 See Acharya et al., supra note 74, at 121-40 and accompanying text.
11 See supra text accompanying notes 81-898.
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changes-the last set of truly major political changes in the U.S. came with
the Great Depression and the New Deal. Major evolutions in economic
institutions, though, may not require such a crisis. Or the most plausible
path may lie somewhere in between, with a gradual growth of some
alternative economic institutions, followed by a large financial crisis that
then makes possible further large political and economic changes,
supported by the new institutions that have slowly grown to pose an
alternative to today's financial behemoths. The last time when crisis hit in
2007-08, progressives were not ready with a menu of either legal or
economic institutional change. It is unsurprising that their efforts to
address the crisis on the fly, especially after Barack Obama took office,
were limited and scattershot, with correspondingly limited success. Before
the next crisis, (and there will be one), there is much to do to put in place
an economic, political, and intellectual groundwork for creating a revised
financial system to replace that of today dominated by Goldman Sachs and
a few like companies.
